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One of the most significant issues on which the battles
of the second session of the eighty-sixth Congress probably
will be fought is the little publicized, little understood
controversy over the advisability and even the legality of
continuing to finance a number of important government act-
ivities through so-called public debt transactions.
ihis paper explains how this "device" works, the methods
used in this "backdoor" approach, and the views of those
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2he public debt transaction can be better understood
after an examination of the public oebt itself and the appro-
priation process which critics of the public debt transaction
allege is bypassed*
Money which is borrowed oy the Treasury and not yet
repaid is called the puollc debt* Most borrowing is from the
public* out the ireasury also borrows from the larger trust
funds which have authority to invest in Government securities*
A few Government enterprises borrow directly from the
public* Ihese borrowings are not part of the public debt*
ihe Government guarantees certain of these securities but not
all of them*
A debt limit, established by statute, controls all but
a minor part of the public debt and all of the Government-
guaranteed debt of Government enterprises* It is a control
over the total debt that can be outstanding at any one time*
Ihe budget surplus or deficit is the principal factor
which determines the amount by which the public debt increases
or decreases from year to year, uther factors may also affect
the debt: the drawing down or building up of the Government's
cash on hand and its bank balances (together with the change
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of corporate debt and investment transactions by the Govern-
ment's public enterprise funds.
The Appropriation Process
ISost Federal agencies have to run the congressional
gauntlet twice to get funds for their programs. First, the
program is authorised by the regular legislative committees.
Ihe authorization law defines the framework and limits of the
program and Bust clear ooth the Senate and House* It includes
a section which "authorizes to be appropriated" certain amounts
to carry out the program ihis does not actually appropriate
the funds* Second coaes the appropriation bill, ihis actu-
ally draws the money from the treasury by directing the Sec-
retary to turn over a certain amount of money to the agency
handling the program, ihis agency must go back to the appro-
priations committees each year and request further appropri-
ations to carry on its program.
From the treasury* s point of view, this double loose has
obvious advantages. Authorisation bills are frequently passed
under the spur of some unusual event or crisis; the second
chec*. gives time for a calmer second look* Legislative com-
mltees tend to have a vested interest In their subjects; the
House Agriculture Committee wants to spend as much as possible
for the farmer* and the House Banking Committee as much as
possible for housing* Ihe appropriations committees can weigh
U.S.. Bureau of the Budget, Federal Budget in. grief—
196^ . (Washington: t.o. Government Printing Office* I960)*
i. •-
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3all th^se de&ands against each other,
Xhe authorisation bill is normally handled i>y the leg-
lalatlve co&cittees having responsibility for the progress
being considered. Xhe expropriations committees handle the
appropriation Oil! and can only appropriate up to the amount
2
authorized in the authorisation bill.
There are seme eases , such as Interest on the public
debt, *here permanent authority exists and whatever amounts
are needed become automatically available each year, without
any action by the Congress. Authorization and appropriation
are related in three ways) (1) authorization is usually in a
separate law, which mist be followed by a specific appropria-
tion act, (2) authorization is contained in the appropriation
act, (3) the authorization act itself provides the contracting
and spending authority* It is this last category that gives
rise to the issue of baclsdoor spending.
Backdoor financing is accomplished by writing spending
authority into the original authorizing act. this eliminates
all review—original and annual—by the appropriations commit-
tees. Xhe initial authorization bill setting up the program
gives the agency involved authority to spend from the public
debt receipts by borrowing the money directly froa the Ireas-
ury. Ho further accounting to Congress is necessary until it
—»—»———»—»- « I—^»»——»——»-l^—«M«»1 MM«—»n— m l« II I - J II ——»—— ———I IN llll III I
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*'Ihera is no requirement that the amounts authorized to
be appropriated in an authorization act be Batched by actual
appropriations, xhe fact is th^t ©any billions of dollars





needs additional borrowing authority.
Ihe theory of authorizations to expend from public debt
receipts is built u^on the relatively simple proposition that
it is expected the outlay of funds fro® the ireasury will he
repaia at some future date* ihis is in contrast to ordinary
appropriations for the general support of the Government where
no return to the Ireasury is expected*
Since it is most usually employed in Government lending
programs or in the financial operations of Government corpora-
tions! it is argued that this provides a sounder way of pro-
viding capital than norm&l appropriations* Under closer
inspection* however, this argument is deficient since Congress
does not resort to the use of the public debt transaction
technique in all financial problems of this type. For example,
in many activities which require initial capital to conduct
a program simulating the normal operation of a business.
Congress appropriates the necessary funds through the regular
appropriations process* It is expected also th*t these sundry
Government "business type" activities financed through appro-
priations will repay the capital to the Ireasury when their
usefulness has ended*
Ihe public debt transaction technique has at times been
used in programs where there was a tacit understanding that
the funds may not oe fully repaid to the Ireasury* For
example, it has been the practice of Congress to periodically
Increase authorizations to expend from public debt receipts
for the Commodity Credit Corporation. Ihis Government organ-
ization is involved in buying surplus agricultural products

5and in reselling them; and it Is tacitly if not officially
recognised that this subsidy program cannot be conducted with*
out a loss. On several occasions Congress has had to provide
it with relief by cancelling the obligations held ay the
-reasury. As of June 10, 1957, the Ireasury Edepartment re-
ported that there had been cancellations of over 13 billion
for this activity, un Hay 3d, 1958, the Commodity Credit
Corporation owed the ireasury $11 billion.^
More recently the device has been used for programs
usually financed by appropriations \*ith the frank Intention




How it came about
Prior to the Civil War, each committee of Congress
handled its own appropriations. But when the national debt
became so large in 1865 » Congress decided that some agency was
needed to take a "second look." Heeded was an agency which
would consider the overall picture and aid the Government in
handling the national debt. 6o the appropriations committees
were created.. Ihe Jurisdiction of the other committees to
handle appropriations bills was tafcen from them.
Ihe creation of the aeconstruction Finance Corporation
in 1932 marked the first recognized departure from the regular
—
"I || || III I I I .1 . Ill II. II ' - " •— ' ~~
^Chamber of Commerce of the United States, laxaayer's
ifcUtti Vol. 7, N?o. 3, (July, 1958), p. 2.
k
Charles B. Seib, "Backdoor Spending lodges Congress 1
Control," Ration's Business. (Cctooer, 1958), p. »*9.

appropriations process. In January, 1932, in order to meet
the emergency situation caused by the depression, the Senate
Banking and Currency Committee adopted a new procedure to
finance RFC activities, ihe Reconstruction finance Corporation
Act | authorized the agency to sell its obligations directly to
the Treasury, the purchms* of these obligations to be treated
as a public debt transaction. Xhis direct oorrowing from tne
treasury obviated the necessity of ootalning approval of
Congressional appropriations committees* ihis method of appro-
priating funds from the treasury in a legislative bill set the
precedent for backdoor spending*
In the 30' s the principal functions financed were three:
(1) relief fros the economic emergency, (2) housing construc-
tion, (3) eld to agriculture. Housing and aid to agriculture
have continued to be dominant purposes in the quarter of a
century during which this form of financing has been used.
Airing world war II and again during the Korean conflict,
various national defense or war purposes were also financed
by use of this device, fables 1 and 2 on page 7 show the
programs financed in this manner since World War II.
Ihe Problem
All expenditures except public debt transactions are
subjected to scrutiny by the appropriations committees in
terms of over-all spending.
In establishing the appropriations committees as stand-
ing committees, Congress recognized that each of the legis-
lative committees is concerned with some specific function or
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Cowaodity Credit Corporation . . • • $12 f 302 .8
Federal National Mortgage Association 6,o6S
International Sank for Reconstruction
and Development (subscriptions) 6,350.^
Export-lispopt .Bank **,h99*0
vredit Line to United £ingdon . . . . . 3*750*0
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(insurance of deposits) . . . . . • 3§0O0*0
Defense production activities » • » • • 2,616*2
International Monetary Fund (subscriptions) • • • 2,325*^
Reconstruction Finance corporation *.....* 1,660*8
Foreign Aid r'rograv . . * . . . • 1*583.3
Blva Clearance loans .... 1,000.0
federal Tioae Loan Banks (insurance of deposits) • 1,000.0
Veterans Loan Program* ••••• 933*1
college Housing Loans ....... 925.0
Federal Savings A Loan Insurance Corporation
(insurance of deposits) •••• 750*0
Dlic Housing Administration .......... 70,
Flood Insurance 500.0
ot. Lawrence Seaway Corporation ......... 1^0*0
























iourcet Ksgasin© of Wall Street, September 26, 1959.
»1
3area of the nation's activities. Xhns the views of the
legislative committees are more specialized and narrow y and
are usually analyzed in terms of their specific interest
rather than the total impact on the Government and the nation.
In fact | the legislative committees ordinarily do not have
comprehensive information on the nation f s finances before them
when considering their specialized subjects, ihe appropria-
tions committees provide a cheese upon the zealousness of the
legislative committers to insure that funds are adequate and
properly used in terms of total demands on the Treasury. Ihe
appropriations committees have b*en described by Representa-
tive Cannon, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee,
as the "saucer in which the hot cup of legislative tea is
poured to cool."'
Circumventing control by the appropriations committees
in the use of this device has oeen justified on the technical
ground that Congress intended that the appropriations commit-
tees consider only expenditures "for the support of the
Government." It is argued that money made available through
the public Uebt transaction technique is not for the support
of the Government but is used by agencies to support or assist
certain segments of the national or international economy, and
efforts to bring these under normal appropriations controls
are stiffly resisted, ihis, of course, involves some falla-
cious reasoning since the impact on the treasury is basically






Some feel that this device can fee used to push the
national debt to over $^00 billion, to increase the Federal
deficit, and to increase inflation as additional Federal
agencies are freed from congressional approval or review of
their spending programs.
Chairman Cannon of the House Appropriations CoiREittee
has saldt
With the public debt transaction, agencies Just go ahead
year after year taking money out of the Treasury with no
accounting* xhe result is thai ve are on the way to
•pending billions of dollars. '
On the other hand, Senator Lyndon Johnson stated on
August 21, 1959
»
Perhaps a few additional words should be said about the so-
called backdoor financing. No one knows exactly who
coined this phrase but it succeeds in giving the Impres-
sion that there is something wrong with providing spend-
ing authority outside of an appropriation bill, but this
is just not so* Hegardless of whether spending authority
is provided in an appropriation bill or by an authoriza-
tion bill, the sajse congressional and Presidential action
is required to enact the spending authority into law.
The only real difference is that the preliminary work is
handled by a different set .of cosasittees oefore the bill
in question is acted upon.**
So the problem centers in this question: Should the
granting of authority for agencies to create obligations or
yWtit, P- 52.
S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Action on the
POff^ent's ^ueat;* for APProprfatflffls aqd; ffew OoUlTOUyW},
Authority, both Cong. t 1st 5esa. t 1Q5Q T Senate Doc. 67 T p. ^

1to spend be prevented except on the basis of appropriation
bills reported by the appropriations committees?
I can get no rested? against this consumption of
the purses borrowing only lingers and lingers it
out, but the disease is incurable*
llliam Shakespeare King Henry IV, *art II)

II. f 3 OF BkCOsQQA 8
The following discussion covers the salient points of
each of the principal methods of bec&door spending*
,j,c aefrt ifofllrtl
A bill authorizing a certain program of Government will
provide for funis for this progress in language that can be
boiled down to this: the head of the agency is authorized to
issue notes or other types of obligations for sale to the
Secretary of the Ircasury; the oecretery Is directed to buy
such notes when the agency head presents then; the Secretary
is authorized to sell Government bonds to the public to get
the money to buy the notes with; and, finally, the Secretary
Is directed to treat the purchases, sales, and redemptions of
the notes as a public debt transaction, ihus the name "public
debt transaction" is derived.
So, Congress has authorized a program of the Government;
the treasury has raised the money to finance the program and
has lo&ned the money to the agency administering the program;
and the agency head has spent the money to carry out the
program. 9si Treasury has some "notes* from the ag ncy to
show for the loan. I'he language in the authorization aet has
not mentioned the word "appropriation" $ the whole transaction










Contract authorizations empower an agency to incur
obligations prior to being granted an appropriation by
Congress. Ihe obligations incurred are liquidated in a sub-
sequent year with funds provided in an appropriation bill.
The first such authorizations were voted by Congress
in 1789* In 19^2 Congress enacted contract authorizations
totaling more than $19 billion* During aorld war II and in
the immediate postwar period, contract authorization in lieu
of direct appropriation enjoyed ^uite a vogue both in esti-
mates submitted in the budget and in appropriation acts. Ex-
perience during this period led the Committee on Appropria-
tions of the House and the Bureau of the Budget to bring this
practice virtually to an end during the \orean War.
Contract authorization involves language authorizing the
agency head to "enter into contracts" to cerry out the partic-
ular program or project involved. Unlike the other devices,
this one does not convey authority to draw money from the
treasury. The appropriation to pay off the contracts is re-
quested through the regular appropriations process but the
trouble is that at this point the role of the appropriations






I, iii i H i i ! iii — -
^Sec. 3? of an act of August 7$ 1789 (1 Stat. L-5*+)
authorized the Secretary of the iressury to enter into eon-
tract for the construction of lighthouses without matting an
appropriation therefor.
*Geerge X. Harvey, BContract Authorization in Federal
Budget rrocedure," PupUS AtittalltfflUffl farrlWt *VII
(Spring 1957), p. 119.
* Ml
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cust be honored. As a practical matter, this precludes the
Congress from exercising its *ill each year on the dimensions
of Federal spending to that extent. It has the effect of
insulating just that much of the budget from effective annual
review.
Contract authorizations totaling $31*6 billion have been
provided by Congress during the 19*+6-59 period. *& shown in
labl© 3* *18.*+ billion was provided in legislative acts and,
thus, constitutes backdoor spending authorizations. Xhe re-
maining §'13.2 billion was granted in appropriation bills
through the regular appropriations process. Most of these
latter authorizations were provided in the fiscal years 19Mi-
1951 when a substantial part of total procurement and con-








Highway Programs (Budget Accounts) ....... 17,193.7
;hway frograms (irust Fund 1957 through 1959) . 9,630.0
Slum Clearance Grants (1950 through 1959) .... 1,250.0
Civilian Airports (19**8 through 1951
and 195o through 1959) 115,2
Total fl8,*K>8.9
Purees Magazine of wall Street (September 26, 1959) P. 17.
3Council of ^>t&te Chamoers of Commerce, Federal Spending




Revolving funas have teen established from time to time
to finance a continuing cycle of operations with receipts
derived from such operations available for us© by the fund
without further action by the Congress, Sometimes a good case
can be made for certain types of *housekeeping" services to be
handled this way, and there is sometimes plausibility to the
argument advanced in other types, but a principal fault of this
technique is that there is almost always no required annual
review and action hy the Congress*
An example of this type of financing is the Defense
troduction *ct devolving Fund, Ibis fund was set up in 1950 to
stinula te production of critical materials and minerals* litle
ill of the Defense i reduction Act authorizes borrowing up to
$2*1 billion from the Treasury.^
yVWfftalS <foy<*rrifient Corporations
the concept of the Government corporation was introduced
during rforld War I t but the few corporations established at
that time were liquidated after the war* A large number of
corporations were organized during the 193$' s * ii3e principal
argument for this organization was that it made possible a
degree of flexibility and adaptation to changing circumstances
thet could not be achieved by the regular Government depart-
ments which were subject to the rules laid down by statute or
III < "I I II I H ill Ill II HH H i I J H I M M IH I I I III
k
C*S* Congress, Senate, Defense Production itorrowtaE




or by administrative regulation, and subject also to the oper-
ating limitations set by appropriation acts. It was quickly
found | however, th*t the independent corporations were too free
of control and wer& not responsible either to Congress or the
General Accounting Office. Jcmc degree of correction was
introduced by the Government Corporation Act of 19**5» which
required them to submit certain budget data*
Itoe corporation is financed from the ireasury in a
variety of ways. It may be provided with initial capital by
appropriation or by public-debt transactions. It is usually
permitted to borrow from the ireasury up to a specified llBit.
In case of impairment, its capital is made good either by
appropriation or by cancellation of its ooligations to the
ireasury. In addition, the resources of the corporation can
be Increased \jfy regular appropriations, fhe corporation is
intended to be financed by these devices on a longer-term basis
than is an agency financed with annual appropriations.
In addition to these external sources of finance, the
corporation is allowed to use its receipts (from loan repay-
ments, sale of products, etc.) to finance further operations
or to pay dividends to the ireasury, without congressional
appropriations. Ihe corporation thus avoids the provision of
the Constitution that expenditures fross the Treasury must flow
from appropriations, since its receipts, technically, never go
into the ireasury.






directing the Secretary of the Ire&sury to pay the amounts
thereof out of moneys in the Xreasury not otherwise appropria-
ted* the language usually reads as follows;
Be it enacted lay the Senate and House of representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
Ihat the secretary of the Xreasury is authorized and
directed to pay, out of any money in the treasury not
otherwise appropriated, to I'.3gt. Salter Casey, 608170,
U.S. Karine Corps, of North Andover, Mass., the sua
of 1270.02. 5
tjote Cancellation
Congress has on a few occasions used this device to
replenish the funds of an agency to continue operations. It is
a very simple piece of language—and again, it can successfully
by-pass the regular appropriations process.
to illustrate how it works, assume th< t an agency, under
the public debt transaction device, has a $1 billion authority
to borrow from the Xreasury. Assume further that it has
borrowed the $1 billion and issued notes to t ^essury as
evidence thereof. Assume further that the agency has spent
most or all of the 11 billion and reports to Congress that it
needs $1 billion more to continue its operations. Congress
could increase the $1 billion authority to $2 billion (again a
public debt transaction), or it could, as it has on occasion,
direct the Secretary of the treasury to "cancel" the II billion
of notes which he holds from the particular agency head. He
thereupon marks them "paid" or "cancelled." Ihe agency head
nMUj Congressional Becord * 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
,












then no longer owe* the ireasury anything—but tht* original
authority to borrow £1 billion from the Treasury was not
changed. In the bill directing cancellation of the notes,
Congress said nothing about wiping off the borrowing authority
—it still stands. 3o t as soon as the Secretary ae&r&s the
notes "paid", the agency head can go to the ireasury with $1
billion of new notes ami borrow another billion dollars against
the original II billion authority, ta*e the money, return to
his agency, and start spending his second billion. Again,
the word "appropriations" has never ^e^n used but another
billion dollars has been removed from the Treasury and put to
the support of a program of Government.
Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure
nineteen six, result happiness. Annual income
twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty pounds
ought and six, result misery*
(&r. Kicawber)
Charles l>lcieens, (David Copperfield)
'
Ill, REftKWKb C0Jf0a£S5IC»AL 1
oince 1930 9 members of the appropriations committees have
been aware that public debt transactions opened a dangerous
breach in their powers, but an effort was not made to stamp
out the spreading practice until 19^9^ Is that year a point of
orUer^was made from the floor of the House of Representatives
to the effeet that the transactions were in fact appropriations.
If the point of order had been sustained, all public debt
transactions would henceforth have required hearings and appro-
val by the house Appropriations Committee* Congressman Boggs
of Louisiana, in the Chair at the time, ruled:
Appropriations in its usual and customary interpretation,
means taxing money out of the Treasury by appropriate
legislative language for the support of the general
functions of pthe Government, the language before us does
not do that ,
*
Authorizing the ireasury to use the procedure of public debt
transactions for the purpose of making loens, Boggs maintained,
did not constitute an appropriation*
In March, 1957 t the House Appropriations Committee
It is the right of every member who notices a breach of
order or of a rule to insist upon its enforcement. Ibis is
called raising a question or point of order, cecause the
member puts to the presiding officer the question as to whether
there has been a breach of order or of the rules, it being the
duty of the presiding officer to maintain order and enforce
the rules. (Kason's Manual of Legislative procedure
>
^James Heichley. "Battle at the Back i)oor, M 1'he Prog-







pointed out in a report that Ha substantial segment" of new
authority to obligate the Government is insulated from effect-
ive annual control by such items as the public aebt transac-
tion. The Committee stated further*
Unfortunately the practice seems to be growing, as it
grows, the basis for effective annual determination of
expenditure levels shrinks, The Congress cannot continue
to place large segments of the budget beyond reach of
annual determination without further seriously impairing
the practical limits of exercise of effective control of
the purse through the traditional means of the appropria-
tions bills.
3
In the last three years, there has been a gro ing concern
in Congress over the use of the backdoor to the Treasury* The
backdoor approaches showed up in alarming proportions in the
second session of the eighty-fifth Congress (1958)« Several
of the borrowing bills slid through that Congress on the wave
of antirecession fever that dominated the early months of the
session. An emergency housing bill became law authorizing
housing agencies to spend an additional $1.9 billion through
Treasury borrowing and other devices free from appropriations
committee control. A $2 billion increase in the Export-Import
3ank*s lending authority used the borrowing route. The Senate
passed borrowing authority for |1 billion of loans for commun-
ity facilities; 250 million in loans and grants to areas of
chronic unemployment} $250 million of long-term loans and
equity investments in small business, and 1350 million of sub-
sidies for the mining industry.
^Seib, loc. clt. . p. 56.
^Ibid .
'.
After the housing and Lxport-Import Bank bills became
law, House members began to feel mounting concern over the
device. They demanded changes. The Rules Committee forced
the Banking Committee to change from borrowing to appropria-
tions for the community facilities loans, ihe Appropriations
Committee forced the Interior Committee to switch over to
appropriations for the minerals bill. Then the Rouse itself
killed both bills.
The House Banking Committee also was forced to switch
over to appropriations for the Small Business Investment Bill
and the Depressed Areas Bill. In both cases the Senate was
forced to accept the switch. A second big housing bill
involving more than $1 billion ultimately died on the House
floor when backers narrowly missed a two-thirds margin needed
for passage under the parliamentary procedure governing the
bill.
The question of financing by this device came up on May
21 t 1953, in the House during the debate on the admission of
Alaska into the Union. It was debated in the Senate on June 9>
195S, during discussion of the Small Business Investment Act.
On February W, 1959 » the argument erupted again in the House
during discussion of the Veterans 1 Housing Bill. Ihe Senate
then had the most significant of all debates on this subject
in early July of 1959, during discussion of financing the
Development Loan Fund of the Mutual Security Authorization











isslon of Alaska Into the
On May 27 , 1958, the bill to provide for the admission
of the State of Alaska was brought to the floor of the House
of Representatives • congressman Cannon of Missouri, Chairman
of the Bouse appropriations Committee, immediately submitted a
point of order that a bill containing unprivileged matter
loses its privilege and therefore the Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs had no authority to bring it to the floor
at that time* ^ Qm unprivileged matter resulted from the bill
being reported by a legislative committee but containing appro-
priations* Ihis was in violation of clause u , rule 21, of the
House, Halting the reporting of appropriations to the Commlt-
tee on Appropriations. Ihe bill, he stated, provided payment
to Alaska of certain proceeds which otherwise would be deposit-
6
ed to the Treasury of the United states. Another section of
the bill required payment of Federal funds to the State of
Alaska.
tfas this an appropriation in a legislative bill?
Chairman Si&lth of the House vules Committee, a staunch
critic of backdoor spending, argued that any language in a bill
which orders the payment of money from the ireasury without the
'Privilege relates to the order of business under the
rules* Essentially it means that the most important matters
of business are greatly expedited by a specific right of
immediate consideration by the House, (House aules and Manual)
°
"Commencing with the year during which Alaska is admit*
ted into the Onion, the Secretary of the ireasury, at the
close of each fiscal year, shall pay to the State of Alaska
70 percent of the net proceeds, as determined by the Secretary
of the Interior, derived during such fiscal year from all sales
of sealskins or sea otter skins ...'"
"










requirement of further action by the Congress is undoubtedly
an appropri.fit ion, Ihe jurisdiction of the Committee on Appro-
priations had been clearly invaded. Alaska could b& just as
good a state and Just as complete without this language as
with it.
Ihose who sought to have the point of order overruled
cited precedents permitting in an admission bill the including
of matters necessary to accomplishment of the purposes for
which privilege is given. Matters of extraordinary importance
should be expedited and not bottled up behind lesser matters.
After all was not the State of Wyoming admitted under the same
rule and same circumstances? This bill provided that 5 percent
of the proceeds from the sale of public lands should go to the
State of Wyoming ana further appropriated $30,000 to defray
the cost of a state constitutional convention.'
Ihe Speaker of the House in preparing to rule on this
point of order indicated that he had suspected that such a
point of order would be raised and with the House Parliamen-
tarian had made a research of decisions of previous Speakers.
In those cases cited, previous Speakers had permitted the
including of matters necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose for which privilege was given, ihe Speaker In making
the decision stated:
... that where the major feature of the bill relates to
the admission of a new State, lesser provisions incidental
thereto do not destroy its privilege when reported by the
,,c 1?!**$ frMPn^Witol frwrfli 85th Cong., 2d teas.,
1956, Vol. 10*, Fart 7 t p. 9211*.
\£oq
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Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, and, therefore,
for these and many other reasons, the Chair overrules the
point of order.
°
The language tact some Congressmen had so violently
denounced as relating to appropriations thus stayed in the
bill.
*W*%* yybftte op %he Sma^l
Emti^m? ;pves^yent am,
On June 9, 1953, in a senate debate on the Small Business
Investment Bill, Senator aobertson of Virginia said that he
would raise a point of order against a section of the bill
which authorised the Small Business Administration to borrow
a total of $250 million from the Ireasury and authorized the
Treasury to borrow funds in order to make this money available.
rhe grounds for this point of order would be that this proce-
ed
dure violated Senate Hule XXV. 7
Senator Robertson discussed at some length and in critic
cal vein the matter of borrowing from the Xreasury. Ke noted
that during his service as a member of the Congress since 1933
there had been many debates and discussions in both Houses
concerning the question of legislation in an appropriation
bill. But he could not recall a Senate discussion of the
question of an appropriation in a legislative bill. Ihis
method of appropriating funds was used during the depression
I£M»> P* 9216.
%nder Rule XXV of the Standing Aules of the Senate, all
proposed legislation dealing with appropriation of the revenue







years and during World War II and perhaps was justified as
these were emergency situations. But Its use In recent years
had become increasingly commonplace* He placed the cumulative
total of direct borrowing from the Ireasury at £1^3 billion as
of June 30, 1957 f with 128 billion still outstanding, Ihe
Senator also stated:
If the Banking and Currency Committee can use this proce-
dure to finance any new program its memoers desire, there
is no reason why all the other committees cannot do the
same* X would not be at all surprised if an attempt is
made in the near future to finance the entire foreign aid
program by direct borrowing from the treasury , thus avoid-
ing the ris* of having these funds cut by the Appropria-
tions Committee. In fact, there already is precedent for
such action, ihe $3,7 billion loan to ,-ngland In 19**6 and
the $60 million loan to Spain in 195*3 w«re financed by
direct borrowing from the ireasury. If the violation of
rule XXV is permitted to continue, an endless nuasber of
Government programs could be financed in this manner. 1^
Senator Case of South Dakota supported Senator Hoaertson
noting that he had first raised this point of order in connect
<
ion with the Bousing Act of June 2%, 19^9 f while he was a
member of the House of Hepresentatives.*1 Be had raised it on
one other occasion in the oen&te but did not ask for a ruling
as he felt the Senate had an inadequate amount of material to
make clear the issues involved.
Later in the discussion, senator Robertson stated that
in view of the magnitude of the question and since the members
of the .Senate should have a little more notice of whet is
involved, the point of order would not be made. Be also




thought that an adverse ruling from the Chair might create a
precedent—particularly if no action was tafeen by the Senate to
overrule it*
After this, Senator Fuloright received permission to have
two statements printed in the Itecord presenting his views in
opposition to such a point of order. Senator Case received
permission to have printed in the Record a letter from the
12Comptroller General dealing with this subject.
$0 the Senate had not yet squarely faced the issue, but
it had been put on guard that the issue would be brought up
again later.
ftwjf HEfctg vn tft« Vetera^
'
Xhe next significant backdoor spending debate of recent
years too*: place on the floor of the House on February *+, 1959.
Xhe bill being c < naldered was the Veterans 1 Housing Bill, ihis
bill was designed to provide additional funds for direct loans
to veterans and to increase the celling on the interest rate
for these loans. ihe particular language upon which the debate
was based:
in addition to the sums authorized in this subsection, the
Secretary of the .treasury shall also advance to the Admin-
istrator such additional sums, not in excess of $30G
million as the Administrator may request. . .*^
Mo point of order was made on this bill. Congressman
Statements &na letter appear on page 9M*? of the
amcord of June 9, 1958.
13J
u.3. , Congressional Record, 86th Cong., 1st jess.,
1959, Vol. 105, Mo. 19, p. 1628.
j
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Budge of Idaho, while not opposing the bill, called to the
attention of th . \..s« that (1) the ,-rocedure called for in
this legislation had not been considered by the Committee on
Appropriations and that (2) if this bill was adopted the Douse
could lose its prerogative of starting apj?ropriation bills; if
the House followed this procedure, they could certainly expect
it from thfc Jenste.
Congressman Gary of Virginia voiced strong objection to
this procedure on the grounds that it was the single isost
important way that control of the purse was being lost by
Congress—no adequate review was mad© of funds being spent.
Opposing Congressmen pointed out that money used in this
program was not lost to the Treasury* As a matter of fact, the
direct loan program showed a very nice return to the taxpayers
even though it was not created primarily for that purpose*
After expiration of the loan program, they pointed out, all
repayments of principal and interest would revert to the
.treasury and since veterans have a record of paying off their
loans on an average of 10 years, the program would show a net
gain to the taxpayers of hundreds of millions of dollars by
196£• Besides, if the increased interest rate provided suffi-
cient money the Administrator of the program would not have to
draw any of the |$00 million,
I'he bill was passed authorizing that sums not in excess
of $300 million dollars be advanced by the Treasury and that
the interest rate be raised from * 3A percent per year to







ihe issue of bacxdoor spending was lost aicid legislation
which most agreed was sorely needed for a v®vy good program.
Senate ^euate on t:*e Jevelo^aent
tfffn fun,3 of
1
U.s fotyej ^curj.ty fl^
On July 1, 1959 i during Senate floor discussion of the
Mutual Security Bill, senator Cese of South i>aHota raised a
point of order against a proposal by the foreign delations
Cossffiittee to place development loans to foreign lands on a
puslic debt transaction basis* According to Senator Case,
funds for these loans would be urawn out of the Ireasury, and
therefore such funds would constitute appropriations* An
appropriation could not oe made in a legislative hill reported
by the Foreign Halations Comittee—appropriations aiust be
reported only by the Appropriations Committee.
Senator Fulbright of Arkansas, Chairsaa of the Foreign
latlons Committee, felt that this restriction would effect-
ively put an end to develc loans* Senator Aiken of
Vermont read to the Senate & long list of programs supported by
public debt transactions, and ergued that, if the Case point of
order were sustained all of these programs would ©<? subject to
the same loss of freedom*
On the aavice of the F arliamentarian, the Chair ruled
against the point of order, justifying the ruling on the
grounds that the practice objected to had been followed in many
previous laws. Qm Senate had acquiesced in teat practice and
no previous objection had been raised.
Ihis touched off a very interesting parliamentary
'J.
'•
r ~ '.. ,
.
•:> ;.!.>.
i ,,j \ i, .-..'..
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situation. Senator Cage temporarily appealed frcs the decision
of the Chair, intending to withdraw the appeal after Baking a
statement* Sensing increased support, however, he later changed
his mind and decided not to withdraw the appeal* Xhis announce-
ment was followed by further debate which was eventually cut
short by Senator Aiicen who moved to lay on the table the Appeal
fro© the ruling of the Chair** ihe Chair ordered a yea-or-nay
vote on the motion to table the appeal. Thus a vote "yea" on
the motion to tabic amounted to a vote in opposition to the
point of order and in favor of continuing the loan procedure*
There were k2 "yeas" and k& "nays" , so the motion to table was
rejected and the appeal still was open to a vote* It appeared
tty the preliminary vote th&t senator Case had et last gathered
enough support to overrule the decision of the Chair on the
point of order, ih^ Senate was very close to the test that it
had previously managed to «ld«ste r .
Senate Majority leader Johnson, sensing tJbtftt t nate
was prepared to throw all of • | ic debt programs into perm-
anent jeopardy, with Dm help of a threatened filibuster by
i^enator Horse of Oregon, managed to get an adjournment before a
final vote*
What happened later that night remains a matter of
controversy* Johnson claims that he m*de a rapid count of noses
tried without success to sway the judgments of several who had
14
* Ihe purpose of such a motion is to enable the bouy to
lay aside the pending question in order to attend to more
urgent business. Consideration of the pending question may be









voted In favor of the point of order, and concluded that if
the Case motion cane to a vote the following day it was certain
1?
to be carried* J
The teat never case. The next morning Senator Johnson
worked out a compromise with the Minority Leader, Senator
iricsen, who had directed the Kepuoiican forces in support of
uen&tor Case the night before. ihe points of agreement between
the two leaders, with the consent of Senator Case, were three:
(1) that the appeal from the ruling of the Chair on the point
of order would be withdrawn, (2) that the Development loan
Fund would be reduced in scope and would receive funis only
through regular appropriation bills, (3) that the entire issue
of bac&ioor spending would be referred to a special inquiry
by the Senate iiules Committee.
The Mutual .Security Bill as debated directed the Ireasury
to turn over five billion dollars from the sale of bonds to the
envelopment Loan Fund for making loans to agencies of foreign
countries at the rate of a billion dollars a year for the next
five years. The compromise authorized direct appropriation of
§700 million for the Development Loan Fund for fiscal year I960
and $1.1 billion in fiscal 1961.
the settlement was presented to Senator Fulbright,
Chairman of the Foreign Halations Committee. He regarded the
reduction in the Development Loan Fund as a blow aimed at his
own prestige and the effectiveness of the Mutual Security Bill
but he finally agreed to the compromise. Later in the day the
15




compromise was approved on tht> floor by voice vote and the
^oiat of order was withdrawn,
A final decision on the principle of puolle debt tran-
sactions had been avci aexi— but at the price of surrendering
its use in an area in which advocates relieved that the
freedom which it grants would have been particularly useful*
As a result of the renewed congressional interest in
backdoor spending, Senator Lyndon Johnson on August 21, 195?
»
received unanimous consent on the floor of the Senate to have
printed on the back page of the Congressional Record a table
(lable II) showing the status each day of new obligational
authority provided hy the Congress outside the appropriation
process* ihis table was in addition to the table already
appearing there daily (Xable I) showing the status of appropria-
tion bills acted upon by the Congress* lable II appeared daily
from August 21st to the end of the session.
as soon as this tablt began to appear, opponents of back*
door spending began to pick at it, ^en^tor ulrksen called
attention to an error but passed it off as a misprint. But he
was not so willing to pass off the fact that the new table did
not adequately emphasise the action taken bf the Senate or the
ultimate results* On September 15th he cited incompleteness
and inaccuracies in ooth table I ana lable II of the back page
and received unanimous consent to have printed on the next to
last page a Xable No* 2 "correcting" lable II of the back page





actions on appropriations. Figures obtained from the Budget
Bureau by Senator £ir*sen showed the President's request to be
$5f220 Billion in backdoor spending with an increase by the
Congress of 1381 million. Figures obtained from the same
source t>j Senator Johnson showed $6,V)0 isillion for the request
of the President with a decrease of £699 million by the
Congress* the differences could not be reconciled at the time
although, according to Senator Dlrfceea, it was a matter of
"interpretation and refinement."*" Ihe tables proposed by
Senator Dlrksen appeared in the record on September 15 and
October 5» 1959
•
On September 10, 1959, Congressman Curtis of Missouri, on
the floor of the House, included in the Kecord three sets of
corrections for lable I, a revised lable II, and a lable III
which included $1,683,900,000 in spending increases not request-
ed by the * resident but "shipped over'* in the other two
17
tables* ' Congressman Cannon on October 5, 1959, remarked in
thi* ieeord that the tabulations furnished by Congressman Curtis
were misleading and inaccurate* Congressman Cannon had :um-
ished his own tables on September 15th for p he aeccrd*
Ihere was no lack of figures for the tables on the bacfc
page (or any other page) but no onm seemed to agree on the
correct set of figures.
, flr, *V&*i JSfflttWjfoq*! Mfg9tftJ$th Cong*, 1st sess.,1959, Vol. 105, *io* 16**, p. Ibl53-ldl5^.




use .yig, ftenalf* ayl,g«
ihe stumbling bloete upon which attempts by Congress to
curb backdoor spending have tripped is the definition of an
appropriation. If agreement Is reached that certain language
in pending legislation relates to appropriations, then no back-
door spending argument develops, the legisletion must be
referred to the appropriations committees. It Is those cases
that circumvent the appropriations committees thet give rise to
renewed efrorts to change the rules of the Senate and the
House, I he changes suggested would make It clear that all
money bills would have to be referred to the appropriations
committees.
Congressman Smith of Virginia, Chairman oi the Hoi
aules Committee, on July 25 > 1956, introduced a resolution
designed to curb the bypassing of the House Appropriations
Committee. ^ 8o action was taken on this resolution. However,
Congressman Jmith introduced a similar resolution, H.Kes. 161,
on February h t 1959. Ihis resolution would amend clause k of
aule XXI of the House to readi
*u No bill or joint resolution carrying appropriations or
other language that will permit the withdrawal of money from
the treasury without further action by the Congress, or
carrying other authority to create obligations by contract
in advance of appropriations, shall be reported by any
committee not having jurisdiction to report appropriations,
nor shall an amends* oposing such appropriation or with*
draws! or such other authority be in order during the
-»——«—«—«—» ii i »m»—m i n imn i —»—
—
i i. n i i ii mm up
lSx K.Bes. 6**o. oxach a resolution does not become a law.
It simply changes one of the House rules of procedure. Ihe
Senate could still continue passing bills or amending House




consideration of a bill or joint resolution reported by a
committee not having that jurisdiction, A point of order
may be raised against any such appropriation, language, or
amendment at the appropriate tia&e during thv reading or the
bill or Joint resolution for amendment . **
The House Rules Coa&ittee held hearings on this resolu-
tion on six different occasions during February and March of
1959* Ibese hearings produced an unusually clear picture of
the disposition of power in the House, oome of the strongest
foes and sturdiest defenders of the Appropriations Coausittee
were called as witnesses. lh* top »en of the Appropriations
Committee testified in favor of the resolution, strong oppo-
sition cas« from the faer.ds cX the committees who felt their
authority threatened by the Appropriations Committee, ihe
Chairmen of the Agriculture Committee, Banking and Currency
Committee, and Chairman Vinson of the Armed Services Committee
testified thit their progress would be crippled by the Smith
resolution. chairman Vinson dealt a damaging blow when he
said:
I have followed toe chair&an of this committee around here
for 30 years, and I plan to continue to follow hia in the
future, but I can not approve a resolution that woul * c^use
disaster t^ soae of the nation 1 s most important defense
projects.^3
Also in opposition to this resolution was Speaker of the House
Sam Hayburn who voiced his objections to reporters during the
Rules Committee Hearings.
^U.S., congress, House, Amending Clause 2(a) of ftule XI
tm fflftW.fr Q$ *%lf >M of tfrf f^jef o? the Ifouse ofesresentatives
r
86th Cong., 1st oess., 1959, . •»• 161,
Pp. 1-2.
20Reichley, loc. clt. . p. 30.
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At the conclusion of the hearings, Chairman Ssdth of the
iules commit tmm recognised that he lacked a majority and never
called for a vote, Re further action has been taken on the
resolution and it is still pending in the Rules Committee,
likely never to reach the floor of the House,
On March 11, 1959 > Senator Byrd of Virginia introduced a
similar resolution which, in part, reads
s
• . .subsection (o) of rule of the standing .cul.es of
the senate is attended to read as follows a
(b) Committee on Appropriations. . .to itfelen Committee
shall be referred all proposed legislation, messages,
petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to the
following subjects
s
1. Expenditure authorisations. As used In this para-
graph, the term •expenditure authorisations' means current
appropriations, permanent appropriations, contract authori-
sations, authorizations to expend from public or corporate
debt receipts, cancellation of obligations of Government
agencies to the Treasury, reappropriatlons, reauthorizations,
and any other authorisations to withdraw moneys from the
Treasury of the United Jt&tes except, . .for the payment
of private claims, 21
Senator Thurmond had on February 17, 1959, introduced a
resolution, 5.<ies. 8l, which contained language similar to
that later introduced in the Byrd resolution.
Both of these resolutions were referred to the Senate
Committee on -iules and Administration, Ho action has bmen
taken to date by the Rules Committee in spite of the announce-
ment by the Chairman on January 7, I960 that after disposition
22
of various money resolutions, they would be considered.
21
S. Con, ms. 16, A concurrent resolution does not
become law but changes & joint rule of the ^>en&te and House,
,..,
22
^»^» t Cohsressj.onsq sfficorfl, 86th Cong., 2d ^ess.
,
I960, vol. 106, No. 2, p, B3.
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iv. BmaujaufiQU ahd cm
ihe Case for the rubllc Debt
4gffttlflt|ftft
Among the arguments used by proponents of the public
debt transection are the following*
1. There hare been many precedents where this type of
financing has been used*
2. On constitutional grounds, landing money from the irees-
ury that will be repaid is not appropriations for the support
of the Government. Honey is not withdrawn from the treasury
until the ireasury has no further claim to the money.
3* Since the public debt transaction is most usually
employed in Government lending programs or in the financial
operation of Government corporations , this provides a sounder
method of providing capital than appropriations, it is not
feasible for a Government lending program to be carried on a
yesr-to-ye&r basis, "to lending institution could effectively
operate if it could not be sure that on the first day of the
next fiscal year its doors would be open or closed. Mo busi-
ness concern can operate without long range plans. a public
debt expenditure device allows needed flexibility in program
operations.
W* iuolie debt transactions are not out fro® under control
of Congress$ control merely originates in a legislative com-




5, Appropriations committees should not assume policy
functions, When the appropriations procedure is used instead
of public debt transactions, appropriations committees, by
withholding funds, could change policies adopted by legislative
committees*
6. If some way is not found to get around the power of the
appropriations committees, the remainder of the House and
Senate will become mere ratifying bodies, subject to the pro-
posals brought forth from the appropriations committees.
7* If all spending were approved by the appropriations
committees, determination of the amount of fund authorizations
would be delayed because both the legislative and the appro-
priations committees would have to examine the operations and
needs of the program.
The Case Against the Public
Debt Xransaction
Opponents counter with these arguments:
1. Onder the Constitution, money cannot be drawn from the
.treasury except in consequence of appropriations made by law.
The word is drawn, not expended. Since public debt transac-
tions draw money from the Treasury, they must be appropriations.
Appropriations, under the rules of both the Senate and the
House must go through the appropriations committees, .there-
fore, the provision for public debt transactions should be
changed to an authorization for appropriations. This would be
in consonance with the rules.






procedures involving the appropriations committer s* Growing
use of the public debt transection coula seriously impair the
congressional power of the purse,
3* The merits of the particular program are not an issue in
this problem* Kembers of Congress could support a program but
still insist tfeat it be financed according to the rules,
^. Sustaining a point of oraer raised against a bill from
a legislative committee on the ground tfeat it carried appro-
priation language would not affect any other programs on the
statute books similarly financed. It would* however, set a
precedent which could be used on later occasions*
*>. With regaru to contract authorizations, the only function
of the appropriations co&ttittees is to provide the funds to
liquidate obligations incurred* s is nothing more than a
rubber stamp procedure insofar as th£ appropriations process Is
concerned*
6* Legislative committees consider matters with special
needs in mind, not in consideration of total needs of the
Government and its ability to meet them.
7* Cutting out backdoor spending will lessen the expense
of running the Qovernzeen^* If Ute backdoor spending of ftl
1 st fourteen years had been subjected to th« second look of
the appropriations process, it is possible that there would
have been fewer deficits and it is practically certain the
deficits would have been smaller and the few rarpluses larger*
3. In some cases activities served are charged a lower rate




9. Ihis device will increase the Federal deficit &nd add to
inflationary pressure.
Xhese in Congress who oppose backdoor spending have been
backed up many times by nongovernmental authorities &s well as
official authorities. Xbe 1.3. Chamber of Commerce has been
one of the main nongovernmental critics of the device. On
the official side, the President, the Secretary of the Ireas-
ury, and the Comptroller General have been strong opponents of
backdoor spending.
President's i-ositlon
Ihe backdoor system of spending drew this comment from
President Eisenhower in his message to Congress on the I960
budgets
. . .even though there are a few justifiable exceptions, the
practice of providing or i nations to expend from public
debt receipts and contract authority, outside the approprla*
tions process is generally inconsistent with sound standards
of budget practice. 1
fhe President's budget for fiscal 1961 contains no proposals
for new backdoor financing.
Views of the Ire&sury department
Answering the argument that this is a legitimate borrow-
ing process and not an appropriation of Federal funds, Treas-
ury Secretary Anderson h&3 stated?
XHcLellan Smith, rt»ill U._>. .-tend Itself into Bankruptcy
through Backdoor Spending?"
, ^y ft&KMtae of '»W ytreefr,





I agree that a legislative en&ctcsent that permits money to
be drawn from the ireasury is an appropriation, 2
Comptroller General 1 s Viewpoint
congress 1 principal financial officer, the Comptroller
General of the U.S., has for many years criticized the use of
the public debt transaction t«chni<iue for authorising expen-
ditures. Several times he has stated th*t the normal appro-
priation process shovld be used rather than the public debt
transaction. Sht following statement sets forth his views i
Authorizations to finance through public debt transactions
result in moneys being expended without the initial review
b/ the appropriations committees and are usually stated in
terms of a continuing maximum amount of obligations to the
.treasury which can be outstanding at any time, thus avoid-
ing the annual reviews by the appropriations committees.
*e believe that the financing of loan programs through
public debt transactions, by combining program authority
with funding, tends to perpetuate programs that might not
otherwise stand the test of continued congressional
scrutiny*
3
Billions of dollars are authorized for expenditure each
year with nc control being exercised by the House and Senate
ropr1st ions Committees. £et, they are the only two commit-
tees which are concerned with the spending budget as a whole;
and they are the only two committees which sight, under more
favorable circumstances than no* exist, actually control the
budget.
2
Letter from Hon. Robert B. anacrson, Secretary of the
Ireasury, to Congressman J. Vaughan Gary, August 12, 1958.
•a
^Letter frogs Hon. Joseph Campbell, Comptroller General
of the limited states, to senator Francis Case, June 6, 1953.
V5 .
f e
the need for full annual control of spending authorize-
tlons through the appropriations process is clearly evident.
Ihe second look, which Congress can tafes t\ appropria-
tions process wltfe the expert guidance of the appropriations
cossEittees, is the safeguard of Congress in enaction! of
expenditures* By allowing the public debt transaction to
flourish, Congress has encouraged special interest groups and
legislative committees themselves to avoid the budgetary
control provided by the norsu,! appropriation process.
ihe obvious solution seems to he to eliminsite the public
debt transaction ana provide that funds required for activities
--lending or otherwise—be subjected to the normal appropria-
tion process «lth Congress getting a double cneclc on each bill
and an annual review of the progress*
Attempts to change tne house and Senate ules to elimi-
nate the by-passing of the appropriations committees have not
succeeded* However, the attempts to change the rules have had
a profound effect u^on the passage of money bills. Some bills
originally intended to be passed providing for use of the
public debt transactions have been changed to appropriations
bills or have been killed.
Ihe renewed interest of the Congress in this problem
brings the revision of the rules ever closer to reality. Ihe
skirmish on the floor of the Senate in connection with the
Development Loan fund came close to a reel test of the present
rules.






most Issues, with the powerful appropriations committees
ag&lnst the device, the effort to deal with the Issue by
suppressing it is running out of time.
• • .one rule which woe betides the banker who
falls to heed it,
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